February 25, 2026
Satellite navigation systems (GNSS), such as GPS, Galileo, BeiDou, and GLONASS, are now a critical infrastructure for transportation, communications, finance, and defense. They provide not only position and speed but also a time reference for synchronizing banking transactions, power grids, and cellular communications. However, such widespread dependence makes these systems vulnerable to two main types of attack: jamming—saturating the signal with radio signals or noise—and spoofing, which deceives the receiver by transmitting false GNSS signals that mimic legitimate satellite signals.
This is where the CMC Electronics Industrial Research Chair in Resilient GNSS Navigation, led by Professor René Jr., comes in. With a budget of over $6 million, this initiative aims to design and validate robust navigation technologies capable of detecting, mitigating, and neutralizing intentional or accidental interference affecting GNSS signals.
Accessible and diversified technological threats
Attacks targeting positioning signals are on the rise worldwide. Once reserved for state actors, they can now be achieved using inexpensive commercial devices such as software radios. When programmed for illegal purposes, these devices can generate false GNSS signals that mimic real signals, potentially misleading civilian receivers and causing time and position errors of several kilometres.
While some of these techniques are used for legitimate purposes—protecting major events such as the Olympic Games or preventing military aircraft tracking—most are illegal and pose a real threat to aviation, maritime, and land safety. In some conflict zones, aircraft now turn off their GNSS receivers to avoid being misled, relying instead on their inertial navigation systems (INS).
Consequences of a GPS failure would not be limited to air navigation: global dependence on its time synchronization would pose a major economic risk, estimated at between $1.5 billion and $2 billion per day for the United States.
Detection and mitigation
ÉTS Professor René Jr. Landry
Chair's work focuses on characterizing different forms of GNSS attacks and designing resilience algorithms integrated into existing avionics systems. The research team is studying dozens of spoofing variants by manipulating the signal's time, frequency, power, or phase, with the initial goal of detecting these events and developing effective countermeasures.
In the initial phase, the Chair’s work will focus on upgrading embedded GNSS receivers on aircraft, reprogramming them to detect anomalies indicative of spoofing and alert the pilots.
The second phase will focus on automatic mitigation, i.e., real-time elimination of spoofed signals before they are processed by the next-gen navigation system.
The goal of this work, carried out in collaboration with CMC Electronics, is also to influence future international standards for GNSS integrity and security, especially in the civil aviation sector, which is increasingly dependant on GPS.
Towards a national testing and monitoring infrastructure
The development of resilient navigation technologies requires realistic testing environments. However, Canada currently has no national facility capable of testing GNSS receivers under controlled jamming and spoofing conditions. Manufacturers must turn to foreign facilities, such as Jammertest in Norway, where capacity is limited.
To address this gap, the Chair proposes to create the Canada CyberJam Challenge, a permanent testing facility dedicated to validating positioning, navigation, and synchronization systems. This project, still in need of additional funding, aims to strengthen national cyber resilience by securely exposing GNSS equipment, vehicles, and critical systems to jamming and cyberattack scenarios.
This type of infrastructure would accelerate innovation, support the training of highly skilled personnel, and strengthen Canada's technological sovereignty in a strategic field.
C-SHIELD: a national GNSS alert network
Meanwhile, the Chair is working on the C-SHIELD initiative, a national real-time monitoring and alert network designed to detect jamming and spoofing incidents on Canadian territory.
The system will rely on the IGS network ground stations and additional sensors deployed on existing infrastructure, such as 4G and 5G cell towers. The collected data will be transmitted to a sovereign server, initially hosted at ÉTS, where advanced algorithms will identify anomalies and issue alerts to National Defense, other regulatory agencies, and industry partners.
The C-SHIELD project will help strengthen Canada's space cybersecurity and ensure an autonomous response capability in the event of an attack on national GNSS infrastructure.
Technology outlook
The expected benefits of the CMC Electronics Chair include:
- developing algorithms to detect and mitigate jamming and spoofing;
- designing certifiable multi-frequency, multi-constellation (MFMC) GNSS receivers for aeronautics;
- developing new approaches to GNSS–INS fusion, integrating new-generation inertial sensors;
- creating intelligent avionics systems incorporating automated integrity and alert mechanisms.
A scientific response to a strategic challenge
By developing technologies capable of maintaining navigation and time reliability in hostile environments, the CMC Electronics Chair is at the heart of major scientific, technological, and sovereign challenges.
The ultimate goal is clear: to ensure the continuity and security of positioning systems on which modern society depends, while placing Canada at the forefront of GNSS resilience internationally.
