In recent years, the conquest of space has accelerated at an unprecedented rate.
In this age of satellite constellations, where thousands of spacecraft orbit the Earth at breakneck speeds, new challenges are emerging. These are not only technical or scientific, but also geopolitical.
Long dominated by the United States and Russia, space exploration is now multipolar. India, China, Europe, and several private players, such as SpaceX with Starlink, are engaged in fierce competition to launch satellites and build communication networks covering the entire planet—and soon, the Moon or Mars. The objective is no longer purely scientific; it is also strategic.
These satellite constellations have become indispensable. They provide Internet access in underserved areas, improve GPS-based location services, monitor the environment, and manage emergency services. But they also raise serious safety concerns.
Space, an open… and vulnerable environment
Unlike terrestrial cables or fibre optics, space communications take place in an open environment. This means that they can potentially be intercepted. When a satellite transmits data to another satellite or to a ground station, any malicious player equipped with the right tools can attempt to intercept and decrypt these exchanges.
This poses risks to the confidentiality of personal data and also to sensitive military or government information. Countries could use their own satellites to spy on others. This is especially true since satellites do not obey land borders: they fly over all countries without distinction.
Today, there are no strict international standards governing the behaviour of satellites in orbit. There is no way to prevent a satellite from flying over a territory or observing a given area. It’s the Wild West of space!
The challenge of quantum cryptography
To secure space communications, conventional encryption algorithms are currently used. These systems are based on the mathematical complexity of certain problems, which would take thousands of years to solve with current computers. But this could change dramatically with the advent of quantum computing.
The infamous “Q-Day,” the hypothetical day when quantum computers will be able to crack most existing encryption systems, is feared by many cybersecurity experts. All it would take is for one country or organization owning such a computer to compromise decades of confidential exchanges.
Fortunately, quantum cryptography, which is based on the principles of quantum physics, offers promising prospects. For example, by generating perfectly random encryption keys and making any interception detectable—since observation alters the quantum state of the signal—it would be possible to create virtually unbreakable communication systems.
But transposing these quantum technologies to space is not easy. They work well on fibre optics because the environment is stable and controlled. In open space, with laser communications, interference (or noise) is much more difficult to control.
Towards intelligent space cybersecurity
In addition to quantum technology, other technologies are being explored to secure satellite communications. One of these involves radio antennas and is called beamforming, or the formation of directional beams. Beamforming involves concentrating a radio signal in a very specific direction. This would limit the risk of interception, as it would be necessary to be in the signal’s path to intercept the transmission.
Artificial intelligence (AI) is also playing an increasingly important role. It can be used to correct errors caused by ambient noise, detect intrusion attempts, or improve encryption key management. Some methods combine AI and quantum technologies to enhance security.
An overcrowded space lacking clear regulation
The spread of satellite constellations, such as Starlink—which ultimately plans to have more than 40,000 satellites in low orbit—is making space very crowded. In addition to these satellites, space debris, even if only a few centimetres in size, can seriously damage a satellite due to its speed.
To avoid collisions, some organizations offer monitoring services. Satellites can then adjust their trajectory to avoid threatening objects. However, this system is still crude: data exchanges between satellites are not automated and do not take place in real time. Information is transmitted to Earth, processed in data centers, and then sent back.
There is an urgent need to harmonize practices. The IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) is currently working on an international regulatory framework to improve “space data awareness,” i.e., shared knowledge of the immediate space environment surrounding satellites. This standardization initiative is called IEEE P1964. The goal is for satellites to cooperate in reporting hazards, sharing critical data, etc., while respecting confidentiality.
Regaining control of our space sovereignty
Ultimately, sovereignty is a fundamental issue. Should we entrust our communications to foreign infrastructure such as Starlink, controlled by private and state interests beyond our jurisdiction, when their surveillance capabilities could grow in the near future? Even if these systems cannot yet intercept or decrypt our sensitive communications, this could change with the advent of quantum computing.
To guarantee true digital and spatial autonomy, it is becoming crucial to develop local, secure, and resilient alternatives, whether through fibre optics or independent satellite networks. This will require sustained investment, strong political will, and enhanced international cooperation.
The security of our satellites is not just a matter of cutting-edge technology. It is at the heart of geopolitical tensions, strategic choices, and a major shift in global communications.
As the stakes shift from Earth to orbit, it is becoming imperative to anticipate risks, develop resilient technologies, and above all, establish clear rules of the game. Without this, space could become the new theatre for invisible conflicts... but with very real consequences.
Licence Creative Commons
This paper was published in The Conversation / La Conversation